Excerpts from “Flying blind” book of Peter Robinson on Boeing 737 MAX tragedy, corporate landscape and deteriorating corporate culture.

On early Boeing culture:

  • No one of us is smarter than all of us (p. 41)

  • In order to launch on-time a truly great airplane, we have the responsibility to work together to (…) introduce an airplane that exceeds the expectations (…). From day one: best dispatch (…), greatest appeal (…), user-friendly and everything works (p. 44)

  • Boing created a group of early customers it called the “Gang of Eight” and involved them in all design decisions (p. 44)

  • The only thing that will make me rip off your head and shit down your neck is withholding information (p. 45) - Mulally, then project leader of 777.

On early and late 3M culture:

  • It had a culture of innovation that employees treasured. Official policy allowed them to use 15 percent of their time on pet projects, and the tenets of “the 3M Way” included generous funding for independent research (p. 101)

  • What’s remarkable is how fast a culture can be torn apart (p. 102) - Art Fry (inventor of post-its) on later 3M culture.

On how outsourcing hamstrings innovation:

  • parceling out [outsourcing] construction of the DC-10 had impoverished the company while enriching its suppliers. (…). Design specifications actually had to be more precise, because any omissions would lead to costly disputes involving lawyers. (p. 85)

  • Now when they needed a part at a last minute or had an idea for a process improvement, it wasn’t a call with a colleague; it was a negotiation with lawyers, procurement-chain executives, human-resources representatives (p. 88)

On GE playbook, applied to 3M and later to later Boeing:

  • While reaching for financial glory, Boeing increasingly was ignoring the basics of customer support. (p. 66)

  • From 1994 to 2004, GE spent $75 billion, 56 percent of its free cash flow, on stock buybacks and dividends. (p. 101)

  • Boeing spent $41.5 billion on stock buybacks from 2013 to 2018 - enough capital to develop several all-new aircraft. (…) Almost 80 percent of the free cash flow (p. 144)

  • It’s systematic. It’s culture. It’s the fact that we have a senior leadership team that understand very little about the business and yet are driving us to certain objectives. (p. 169) - on later Boing culture.

  • About late Boing culture that was no longer dominated buy engineers: It was difficult for the safety culture to stop something. (…) Groupthink was encouraged (p. 223)

  • Cultural negligence, incompetence, or corruption starts at the top (p. 236)

About flawed process of airplane certification, costs, and aviation business:

  • Southwest had flown dozens of jets on tens of thousands of flights without inspecting them as required.. Finally, they found: cracks in half dozen of planes, including one crack that was four inches long. (p. 125)

  • Paying for pilots, maintenance and cabin crews (…) comes to 20 percent of airline operating budget - more than it spent on fuel (p. 137)

  • Dreamliner: [had] fewer of the issues with dry nose and throats after flights. (Carbon fiber doesn’t corrode like aluminium so humidity could be kept higher). (p. 104)

  • FAA was called: “the tombstone agency” because it only seemed to act swiftly when people were dead. (p. 118)

Other:

  • In flying, the superior pilot uses superior judgement to avoid situations that might require the use of superior skill! (p. 69)

  • Dogs have fleas, and engineers have human factors (p.142)

  • Strategy was no a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea though constantly changing circumstances. (p. 97) - Welch on strategy (from van Clausewitz).

  • If you weren’t already in the business, would you enter it today? (p. 97)